Poor planning stops work at Millstone 3

by PAUL CHOINIERE, Day Staff Writer
October 01, 2025

Waterford � Poor planning for the current refueling outage at the Millstone 3 nuclear plant led to a series of "near misses" and increased the chances of an accident that could have damaged the reactor core, warns an internal report submitted by a plant safety inspector.

As a result of the planning problems, Nuclear Oversight, the plant�s internal watchdog department, issued a "stop work" order on all systems that could affect "key safety functions." The exception to the order was work needed to restore safety-related equipment.

Terrence McIntosh, a spokesman for Northeast Utilities, said the company is not speculating as to when the order will be lifted and how much the restart will be delayed. Millstone 3 had been scheduled to return to service June 15. The refueling outage began May 1.

McIntosh said the work stoppage showed Nuclear Oversight is performing its function to ensure plant safety. Diane Screnci of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said NU showed appropriate conservative decision-making in stopping to assess the situation rather than forging ahead.

The report by Nuclear Oversight engineer D.G. Dickerson indicates that many of the same types of mistakes that got Millstone in trouble with regulators in the first place were repeated in preparing for the refueling. There were failures to follow procedures, failures to take corrective actions, failures to file required reports.

Millstone 3 was shut down for more than two years before getting NRC permission to return to service in July 1998. Millstone 2 returned to service three weeks ago. It was out of operation more than three years because of its problems.

Dickerson�s field notes point out that proper planning is critical before a safe refueling operation. Otherwise, work on one system could cause problems for another or leave critical safety systems inoperable.

For this reason, Millstone has specific procedures and deadlines in preparing for an outage, polices that are based on industry standards, Dickerson notes in his report. A safety review team, needed to review "shutdown risk," is supposed to be in place five months ahead of time. All reviews are to be completed and a plan in place two months before the refueling.

"The above milestones were not met for Millstone Point 3 for Refueling Outage 6," states the field notes. "Based on observations and reports from plant personnel this condition was known by Millstone Point 3 management (and) Nuclear Oversight�"

The inspector also found that condition reports � required to be filed when a condition exists that violates procedure or increases risk � were never filed when the deadlines were missed. The final outage review was not completed until just a week before the outage.

"A cursory review" of the report disclosed several problems with the planning, according to Dickerson�s report.

Among the planning errors was a schedule that called for the reactor to be drained at the same time there was a test to determine reaction to a power loss. David Lochbaum, a nuclear safety engineer with the Union of Concerned Scientists, said both procedures carry some danger and should never be done at the same time.

The loss-of-power test could leave some instruments inactive, something you don�t want to happen while the reactor is being drained, Lochbaum said.

The planning also called for the hatch to be open during the draining down of the reactor, a time when, in the event of a loss of coolant, the reactor core could begin boiling in just 16 minutes, according to the report. The diesel generator that was scheduled to be used to supply backup power takes 30 minutes to start, 14 minutes after the estimated boiling time, the report says.

"The known near misses in combination with the late planning and lack of adherence to (scheduling requirements) are considered precursors to an event that would result in the loss of a key safety function during (the refueling)," Dickerson concludes in his report.

In another development Friday, NU filed a report with the NRC noting that two safety-significant pumps failed to work when recently tested. The pumps are located in an engineering safety building and would be used to pump out groundwater or service water that could flood it and prevent access during a nuclear accident. The reason for the failure is being investigated, but the initial speculation is that too much lubricating oil was used on the pumps, which are air driven.

Rosemary Bassilakis & Sal Mangiagli
Citizens Awareness Network
54 Old Turnpike Road
Haddam, CT 06438
Ph/fax 860 345-2157
[email protected]
www.nukebusters.org

Print-Friendly Page | E-Mail a Friend