Some material will be encased in glass or ceramic blocks and consigned to a permanent underground repository. The rest is to be combined with conventional nuclear power plant fuel and burned in commercial electricity-generating plants... in the $2 billion program...

Keeping the material in storage would be easiest and cheapest, officials said, but that would perpetuate the danger that the material could fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue nations.

The United States produced about 98 tons of it before ending production in the late 1980s.

The administration is planning to release a Dec. 3 letter to President Clinton from a panel of prominent nuclear scientists who say it is "essential to pursue both" forms of disposition--conversion to MOX and vitrification--because vitrification alone will not satisfy Russia, however appealing it may be to the anti-MOX arms-control community.

"In fact," the letter says, "there is much reason to think that the Russians will not eliminate their plutonium stockpile at all if the United States implements only immobilization." The Russians "might then merely store their stockpile of weapons plutonium indefinitely, which is what we should most wish to avoid."

Among the signers were John F. Ahearne, former chairman of a federal nuclear weapons safety commission, and Wolfgang H.K. Panofsky, a physicist at Stanford University.

However, even if this political argument in favor of MOX fuel disposition prevails over the objection that it violates a long- standing U.S. policy against commercial use of plutonium, the MOX fuel option still faces a long list of difficulties before it can be implemented.

One official involved in preparing the disposition plan said it would be so easy to stir up community opposition with a "plutonium is coming to your neighborhood" campaign that he doubted any U.S. utility would ever commit itself to MOX fuel.

That is why the Energy Department has "retained the option" of shipping the MOX fuel to Canada for consumption in that country's heavy-water reactors "in the event that a multilateral agreement to use [Canadian] reactors is negotiated among Russia, Canada and the United States," according to the plan.

the discussions of Gallium, Americium, and isotope ratios for Pu-240 associated with weapons grade Pu never made it into the final PEIS

weapons grade Pu has a lower ratio of Pu-240 so there are more "stringent criticality restrictions," and subsequent higher costs. Americium is an issue because "this facility is not planned for high degrees of automation."

The Generic MOX Fuel Fabrication requirements has only 34 work stations total, so for a two shift operation there would be 64 work stations for the actual fuel fabrication. How many people per work station is an unknown.

infrequent references to the possibilities of aqueous processing

The facility is expected to create 15 metric tons of "clean MOX scrap" and 1 mt of "dirty mox scrap" annually. The former could be recycled, the latter can only be recycled with a chemical dissolution and purification process.

SRS clearly has the most exhaustive documentation. Hanford's responses are only in final draft form, and Pantex's is a mix of drafts and revisions. Amarillo boosters believe DOE has a bias towards SRS?

--Note: this is why the community has to put on a full court press

note location of Pantex compared to SRS (and Rocky Flats)

Bringing plutonium processing to Pantex would change its role and threaten area agriculture for short-term jobs. Bringing plutonium processing to the Pantex Plant would drastically change its role and threaten area agriculture for a short-term gain of jobs, members of local citizens groups said

One facility--ARIES (Advance Recovery and Integrated Extraction System) would convert plutonium pits into either metal pucks that are not bomb-ready and would be stored indefinitely; or plutonium oxide powder that ultimately would be used to make fuel for nuclear reactors that produce electricity. The second mission considered for Pantex would create reactor fuel. The plutonium oxide produced by ARIES would be blended with uranium oxide to make mixed-oxide, or MOX fuel pellets. The MOX pellets would be made into fuel rods for burning in nuclear reactors.

Transuranic waste, or TRU, is generally produced by plutonium processing.

The DOE estimates that a MOX facility would produce about 306 cubic meters, or 400 cubic yards, of TRU waste per year. That waste would have to be processed, packaged and shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in southern New Mexico for disposal. An ARIES facility would generate about 67 cubic meters, or 88 cubic yards, of TRU waste each year.

Pantex traditionally has not produced TRU waste. Earlier this year, a shipment of three barrels of TRU waste generated by a dismantlement mishap at Pantex was a major news event in Santa Fe, N.M., where the waste was trucked through on its way to Los Alamos. "'In 40 years, you've had one waste shipment of transuranic waste out here that made headlines," said Don Moniak of STAND. "That would be a weekly event almost if all of this comes here. ... That's only the transuranic."

Boyd Deaver, an official with the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, said TNRCC has jurisdiction over hazardous waste, but not radioactive waste. Boyd Deaver, an official with the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, a state regulatory agency, said TNRCC has jurisdiction over hazardous waste, but not radioactive waste. DOE regulates radioactive waste generated by nuclear weapons work.

DOE officials have not thoroughly defined what wastes will be generated by the ARIES and MOX processes, which concerns state regulators, he said. DOE officials have not thoroughly defined what wastes will be generated by the ARIES and MOX processes, which concerns state regulators, he said.

Plutonium processing at Pantex would bring hundreds of high-paying jobs to replace those lost as nuclear weapons dismantlement winds down at the plant, local civic leaders said.

Mason & Hanger Corp. had about 3,600 employees last year at Pantex. It now has 2,950 employees, but by 2003 Pantex could lose up to 2,100 jobs as dismantlement work tapers off, according to DOE estimates. That would leave only 850 workers six years from now.

According to estimates prepared by the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium, the ARIES project could bring 125 construction jobs over six years and 800 plant jobs during 20 or more years of operation.

MOX fuel fabrication plant would create about 325 construction jobs over six years and 500 plant jobs for operations over 20 years.

"One of the numbers I think is compelling is we're talking about a $500 million construction project," Juba said.

Pantex is competing against the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, the Hanford Site in Washington state, and the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. A recent assessment of the MOX candidate sites noted that Pantex has limited personnel and equipment for radioactive waste management and no infrastructure for processing special nuclear materials. The report noted that the Savannah River and Hanford sites have extensive experience in waste management and plutonium processing.

Using the nation's surplus plutonium to make MOX would provide a viable energy source, and would further international efforts to keep the bomb out of unfriendly hands, supporters said.

The Amarillo Economic Development Corp., the city's tax-funded economic development arm, will spend $350,000 in the hope of luring the two facilities to Pantex.

Dale Klein, a top official with the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium, said the Russians are skeptical of efforts to bury plutonium-contaminated wastes in glass or ceramic logs because they fear it could be recovered and used again in nuclear weapons. "You need to change the isotopic content of that plutonium to make it less desirable as a weapon material," Klein said. Converting the plutonium to MOX fuel pellets would make it useless for weapons.

The Russians, who view the plutonium as a valuable energy source, plan to use most of their surplus plutonium as MOX fuel, which will be burned in nuclear reactors. The rest of the material may be immobilized in glass or ceramic and buried, Russian officials said. The United States plans to use about 32.5 metric tons of its surplus plutonium as reactor fuel. The other 17.5 metric tons - mostly material deemed unfit for reactor use - will be immobilized in glass or ceramic and buried in a yet-to-be-built nuclear repository.

Pantex stores more than 8,000 pits in sealed drums that are kept inside undergound bunkers. The plant is authorized to store 20,000 pits.

Los Alamos scientists using the ARIES process already have converted 50 plutonium pits from dismantled weapons into other forms, said Dr. Jim Toevs, a Los Alamos researcher. Most have been converted to plutonium-metal disks, but some have been changed into plutonium oxide powder. And more than 600 MOX pellets have been produced from weapons pits at Los Alamos. Researchers now are gearing up for a three-year demonstration that is expected to convert 250 plutonium pits, Toevs said. The demonstration is expected to begin early next year at Los Alamos.

In the ARIES system, the plutonium pit is processed by operators who stand outside "glove-boxes" - sealed-metal and glass enclosures - and handle the nuclear material inside with lead-lined gloves. The boxes are oxygen-free to prevent fires. Ed Martinez, a Los Alamos engineer, said engineers plan to use robotics during the ARIES demonstration as much as possible to reduce the risk of operator exposure to plutonium

--Note--fewer jobs

Gallium must be removed from bomb-grade plutonium to produce MOX. In January, Los Alamos scientists reported that substantial amounts of gallium could corrode the material that covers nuclear reactor fuel rods, allowing the nuclear material to escape. Avens said U.S. officials hope to use a dry, high-temperature process to remove gallium and other contaminants from the plutonium. The DOE hopes to avoid using an aqueous process to remove the contaminants because that process has produced large volumes of liquid radioactive waste in the past.

To speed up plutonium disposition, the United States also has left open the option of using European facilities to produce MOX fuel until a U.S. facility is operational. But Toevs said such a move is unlikely because sending U.S. nuclear material across the ocean would stir international protest.

In 1993 there were 242 people working at BN in Dessel, of which 50 executive staff. Additionally, were 6 people subcontracted at Tecnubel and there were 3 interim-workers.

Of the total of 242 workers, there were:

- 24 in department of safety and security

- 70 in dep. production

- 59 in dep. quality

- 21 administration

- others

o Advocating plutonium reactor fuel in the name of "disposition" leaves the misleading impression that this is a means of actually disposing of plutonium. Only a small amount of plutonium (3-5%) can be incorporated into the fuel. As much as 80% of the plutonium, which would still be suitable for use in nuclear weapons, could remain after the fuel is burned in the reactor. The National Academy of Sciences states that the actual reduction in plutonium, "... would have little impact on overall security risks."

o Current estimates project a quarter of a century to "burn" much less than half of all plutonium ever produced by the U.S. The public (and taxpayers) will still be left with huge quantities of reactor waste for which we have no viable disposal options.

o Burning MOX fuel in nuclear reactors undermines long-standing U.S. policy against using plutonium for civilian purposes.

o If disposition truly is the objective, immobilization (glass or ceramic logs) remains the safer, more economical option that minimizes both the risk of theft and the necessary handling of plutonium.

The Amarillo Economic Development Corp. board of trustees voted Thursday to spend up to $350,000 in its effort to attract jobs to the Pantex Nuclear Weapons Plant.

Ahearn:

Today's announcement is close to what their panel (US Russian Independent Scientific Commission, I think) recommended. Four reasons for dual track: 1) don't know problems of either technology, 2) can get it out of glass too easily, 3) need bilateral, bipartisan approach, 4) influence on Russia.

Civilian use: Oleary said it was US policy not to use civ. reactors to PRODUCE Pu, but no policy against using civ. reactors to BURN Pu, ultimately it may require government ownership. They would not go to Europe for MOX fabrication, but may run tests in Canada on the CANDU reactors. Ahearn chimed in that many utilities wont want Pu in their reactors, its a national security issue, not a sop to utilities. Questioned about paying utilities a premium to use MOX, and could all the Pu be MOXed, O'Leary replied that it clearly would have to be paid for, not a premium price, if immobilization doesn't work, all of the Pu could be MOXed (she failed to mention the processing some of it would require).

Benefits of Reactor/MOX option:

1. Parallel path with Russia (not sure why this is a benefit) 2. Demonstrated technology (but so is vitr) 3. Pu is reduced from weapons-grade to reactor-grade (Tom Collina, ISIS, and Steve Dolley, NCI, noted that this was a false "benefit" as there are proliferation/arms control risks with both--it may be a perception, but still "plutonium is plutonium")

Liabilities of MOX:

1. the most bulk processing steps of all three alternatives 2. could be percieved as counter to US civilian Pu use policy 3. some material not well-suited for reactor use

Benefits of CANDU/Burning Pu in Canadian Reactors: 1. possible joint US/Russia implementation 2. moves Pu to a 3rd country (gets it out of OUR backyard) and creates add'l barriers to re-use in weapons (?not sure how)

Liabil's of CANDU:

1. internat'l transport

2. not a demonstrated technology

3. promotes Pu use in CANDU technology

4. may increase resources required for safeguards, a drain 5. questions about foreign security stds.

Benefits of Immobilization/Vitrification: 1. fewer bulk processing steps

2. existing capability--"can-in-canister" technology 3. no weakening of civilian Pu use policy 4. all Pu in form suitable for vitrification

Liabil's of Immob/Vit:

1. Pu remains weapon-grade (as Tom C. argued, this is probably irrelevant, "Pu is Pu")

2. raises re-usability issue--add'l R&D required and underway

(so if these 2 are resolved, will the vitrif/immob option have NO liabilities?)

Benefits of Borehole:

1. technical capability

2. increases resistance to theft/diversion

Liabil's of Borehole:

1. siting difficult

2. delays would impact Russian program

Benefits of Hybrid option [MOX + Immobilization]:

1. fastest implementation (Tom Collina, ISIS, took issue with this, believes vitrif would be fastest)

2. redundancy, "backup", protects against technical delays (Tom C. argued that since Russia will probably proceed with the reactor/MOX option, then if US proceeds with vitr/immob option, there still is 'redundancy' benefit; Wolfsthal replied we shouldn't rely on Russia, US should have independent capability in both)

3. better suited to various Pu forms (but so is vitrif only)

Liabil of Hybrid:

1. more licensing

2. more processing sites

3. more safeguards

DOE's Summary:

1. hybrid has significant benefits

2. need early consensus-building and political will (will require sufficient funding, bipartisan support and time)

At release of DPEIS there were no preferred alternatives except:

1) LLNL -- NIF, CFF

2) LANL -- Atlas, re-establish pit production capability 3) Pantex -- downsize assembly/disassembly... no preferred alternative for HE

1) downsize HE production at Pantex

2) secondary and case fabrication at Oak Ridge 3) downsize non-nuclear production capability at Kansas City 4) Sandia, SRS, NTS -- no change to existing missions

Dan Charles (NPR): Will there be downsizing at Pantex?

Gudice: PEIS deals with facility downsizing. Overall, 50% reduction in square feet (footprint)... Y-12 will be 10 - 20% of current... Pantex will be 50-60% of current... Downsizing activities will start in 1998, last till 2003.

Fred (?)(Channel 7 Amarillo): What about job losses at Pantex?

Reis (?): We have to deal with post-Cold War realities, fewer weapons are being processed... DOE has a job force reduction pla

Gudice: At KCP and Pantex (mostly nonnuclear) decommissioning will start (?)... some parts will be put in cold standby... Y-12 is the biggest problem because it is nuclear... $131 million/year for footprint reduction in standby costs awaiting D&D... it remains to be seen whether DP or WM (?) will pay for it

Mayer: Examples of any changes?

Gudice: People asked if we would close out HE at Pantex. We decided not to... Socio-economic issues raised caused some revisions... accident impacts at Pantex and LANL... water resources... health effects... no fundamental changes to set of alternatives

the Assistant Director of MOX for BNFL, Arthur Roberts, said the following in response to a question I posed to him about the capability of the SMP to make weapon-grade plutonium into MOX:

"This plant [SMP] is not set up to handle weapon-grade plutonium. It would require modification to handle weapon-grade plutonium. BNFL haven't looked at it in any detail." Arthur Roberts, 3 March 1997.

Either Roberts or Simon Marshall, the BNFL Works Manager for MOX Fuels, reaffirmed it on television. (I saw the clip on the run and do not remember which one of them spoke for BNFL.)

The main problem appears to be that weapon-grade plutonium would not meet the criticality criteria that have been set forth in the "safety case' for which the plant has been designed. I understand informally from a source outside BNFL that the problem might be with the uranium-plutonium mixing equipment. This equipment (and/or other equipment) would have to be modified, or a new line built to mix weapon-grade plutonium with uranium. Evidently, this would take time. Thus, the best argument for using BNFL to make a substantial number of LTAs -- that the testing of MOX made from weapon-grade plutonium could begin relatively soon if existing MOX facilities are used to make LTAs -- does not appear to be valid for the SMP. Roberts and Marshall (who was also present during my visit) did not want to state which modifications would be required or how long it would take to make them. There are currently two MOX fuel fabrication lines in the SMP, one for plutonium dioxide from PWRs and one for that from BWRs.

Following agreement between Russia and fuel cycle companies Cogema and Siemens, it is reported that a plant for the production of Mox fuel from ex- military plutonium is to be built in Russia. Construction will start in 1999 with startup scheduled for 2001.

The DOE prefers a consortium approach to obtain the desired services, i.e., single organization would be responsible for providing all desired services, including technical and managerial integration of these services. Consortia must be led by a U.S.-owned company involved in one of the principal consortium activities. A phased process will be used to select a consortium obtain the desired services. The MOX fuel fabrication facility will be designed, licensed, and operated by the consortium on an existing DOE site to be selected through a separate site selection process by DOE. The facility will be Government-owned and either newly constructed or the modification of an existing facility. The MOX fuel fabrication plant will be operated solely for the disposition of U.S. Government surplus plutonium and the Government will be responsible for all transportation of plutonium materials.

The element, gallium, can be removed from the plutonium through a chemical process the Energy Department uses, but this generates large quantities of waste water contaminated with radioactive materials, nuclear weapons scientists say.

A cleaner removal process has been tested successfully on a small scale, but it will take more work to develop it for use on the tons of material that would be needed, experts say. Such a process could take years to develop and test, they say. And even with the cleaner system, engineers would still have to decide how much residual gallium would be tolerable in reactor fuel.

But in a table estimating costs, the department listed "adverse variations" that included removing gallium which might add $200 million to the $1 billion cost to turn plutonium into fuel and to prepare reactos to use it.

The first step in creating MOX from weapon-grade plutonium is to convert the plutonium into plutonium dioxide. The process to do this does not yet exist (Rougeau, 1996). However, such a process is under development in the US and it has been given the tentative name of ARIES - Automated Recovery and Integrated Extraction process.