I was the first speaker at a large gathering and I told them what was wrong with cruise missiles and B-52 bombers and I told them in acute, unending detail, the wing span, the engine power, the speed, the guidance, and on and on and on and on, and when I finally started giving them all the facts, I subsided to a modest sitting ovation, and, Helen took the pulpit. Within five minutes she had the audience on their feet shouting, waving, hugging each other, and I came to the realization that facts are important but what is more important is what those facts mean to you and I want to follow that, ah, principle today. I’m going to be talking about the meaning of the facts.

I also reached the second conclusion following that experience. Never follow Helen Caldicott at the podium. You will notice the speaking order. The first two eminent and authoritative speakers have addressed a number of reasons why nuclear abolition is the only sure defense against the nuclear holocaust. That conclusion, I think, is inarguable. As long as the weapons exist, the certainty grows that they will be used either by design, by accident or human error. In the words of the [Canberra?] Commission specifically, "the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used, accidentally or by decision, defies credibility. The only complete defense is the elimination of all nuclear weapons."

So why, then is the world not moving rapidly to rid itself of this immense danger. I’m going to address that proposition in—with two main points. First, the primary reason is the absence of the political wisdom and will to abandon the misbegotten concept of nuclear deterrence. This lack is evident in Washington DC where our leaders cling to the fallacy that U.S. nuclear superiority strengthens our nation and provides a major means of influencing and controlling events around the world. The second point to be made is that there is no valid military, no valid political, and no valid technological reason, why we can’t get rid of all nuclear weapons. The nay-sayers will tell you over and over again that abolition is impossible and they will assert that military considerations or technological limitations or political realities defeat the goal of nuclear abolition. These are assertions, not facts. And given the will and wisdom to work toward abolition, all issues can be resolved by a cooperative world community under the rule of law.

This having been said—that abolition is possible, I must confess as Bill Arkin did, it is not going to happen unless and until there’s a massive change in policy in Washington DC. Without American leadership, not only is abolition dead in the water, but nuclear proliferation will continue to impose a great and growing danger to this world. The absence of U.S. leadership now is particularly alarming because we led efforts in 1995 to extend the non-proliferation treaty indefinitely. We were for world peace and for the end of nuclear weapons. We deemed that extension critical to U.S. security. And in order to inspire non- nuclear states to agree with us, we entered along with the other four nuclear states into a formal statement of principals and objectives for nuclear disarmament.

This, even more clearly than Article 6 of the NPT itself, reaffirmed the nuclear powers’ commitment to "the determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon states’ systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons." This is a statement by five nuclear powers.

In direct conflict with his own unequivocal pledge to disarm, President Clinton barely two years later flatly renounced any intention to do so. In presidential decision directive #60, which Bill Arkin described to you in part, he determined that nuclear weapons, and this is a quote, "would remain the cornerstone of American security indefinitely.

This directive also sets forth some other policies that are directly contrary to the goals of non-proliferation and nuclear abolition. The president reaffirmed America’s right to make first use of nuclear weapons, again, and intentionally left open the option to conduct nuclear retaliation against any nation which employs chemical or biological weapons in attacks against the United States or its allies.

He went on in this directive to state that we would maintain the nuclear triad. This is our long range bombers, our land based ICBMs and our CB based ah, ballistic missiles. And we would maintain them, even worse, at a high state of alert. Bill Arkin mentioned to you that we have a thousand, several thousand in a condition that would permit launch on warning of any impending nuclear attack on the United States. This is a most dangerous doctrine which puts thousands of nuclear weapons on a hair trigger, and thereby creates the risk of starting a nuclear war through misinformation, fear, as well as through human error or system malfunction.

Finally his directive specifically authorized a continuing targeting of numerous sites in Russia and China as well as planning for strikes against the so-called rogue-states in connection with regional conflicts or crises.

In short, U.S. nuclear posture and planning remain essentially unchanged seven years after the end of the Cold War. The numbers of weapons, of course are lower, but the power to annihilate because of their improved quality and accuracy and reliability is still in place with 12,000 nuclear weapons in the United States and an equal number in Russia.

This doctrine would be bad enough alone, but it is reinforced by continued efforts to extend and enhance the capabilities of the U.S. nuclear forces. A major element of this process is that benignly titled "stockpile stewardship program." Who can be opposed to "stewardship" of our nuclear weapons. That sounds reasonable. Unfortunately, they’re spending more than four billion per year in this program alone, to maintain not only security of our weapons, but to test and replace weapons’ components and maintain full wartime readiness of approximately 12,000 strategic and tactical bombs and warheads.

Not only are we doing that, in March of this year, the U.S. Airforce dropped two B-61-11 bombs from the B-2 being put to its first test in order to complete certification of a new design for earth penetrating nuclear weapons. We were actually increasing this capability in clear proof of our intentions to improve our nuclear war fighting capabilities. Furthermore, the Los Alamos national laboratory recently resumed limited production of plutonium triggers for thermo-nuclear weapons. Every place you look, still building, still adding. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory is preparing a new capability called the National Ignition Facility where conditions within an exploding nuclear device can be simulated. Now when you supplement this with continuing sub-critical explosive tests in Nevada, and I think one was conducted yesterday, again, these extremely sophisticated ah, experiments enable the U.S. to employ means not available to the other signatories of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty to develop and validate new w—nuclear weapons designs.

To give even more evidence of the powerful influence of the pro-nuclear deterrent establishment—it’s been referred to several times here—the U.S. will decide this year on how and when to resume the production and stockpiling of Tritium. Stockpile Tritium, the indispensable fuel of the nuclear—thermo-nuclear ah, weapons. The fact is that the military has enough Tritium on hand today for all of its weapons until the year 2,006, and enough for at least 1,000 warheads to be completely ready in the year 2024. That gives you a little idea about what the term indefinite means.

All of this, of course, is being done at immense cost. Seven years after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. is still spending at least 30 billion dollars a year to maintain and enhance its nuclear war fighting capability. This approach to nuclear deterrence is an affront to every non-nuclear state which accepted our promise to disarm as an inducement to extend the na—non-proliferation treaty. I think it’s a criminal act.

It is also, of course, a provocation which gev---jeopardizes the goal of non-proliferation. We are sending a clear message that the most powerful nation on earth is still going to rely on nuclear weapons as key elements of our security and military strength. This is a signal which can only stimulate other nations to consider the need to create similar capabilities. Did the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests reflect the U.S. example? In part, yes. Ah, did they—will there be more Indias and Pakistans in our future? Almost certainly, yes, unless we lead the world away from indefinite reliance on nuclear weapons as the purported elements of national security and power.

America must lead or abolition is doomed. How and when and where do we lead? Well, here we suffer almost from an embarrassment of riches. We have Jonathan Shell’s book, The Gift of Time, which tells us we are at a rare moment in history when it is possible to move toward this goal. Admiral Stansfield Turner distinguished naval officer has written a book called Caging the Nuclear Genie, which focuses on the force management and technical questions of disarming. The Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy and Peace Action right here in New York this year published a roadmap to nuclear abolition. The proceedings of the 45^th conference of the Pugwash Conference was edited by Nobel Peace Prize Winner, Josef Rotblatt and is entitled, Towards a Nuclear Free World. Scientists are even getting down already to the idea of describing exactly how we would accomplish this reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons with absolute confidence in compliance by other nations. Ah, sometimes when I read the description of how they would do it, I get data block myself, but I figure that’s just revenge for Rome.

Ah, the point is, many highly intelligent people have already done a great deal of work to pave the route to nuclear abolition. The problem is not can it be done, not how to do it, but to decide that abolition is the only wise course of action today. As I’ve already argued, that decision must be made by the United States, because it can’t happen without American leadership.

Well, let me put it another way: Nearly two years ago, I joined with 61 other generals and admirals around the world and signed a call for nuclear abolition. In that appeal, we frankly confessed that the final solution was beyond our grasp. This is what we said: The exact circumstances and conditions that will make it possible to proceed finally to abolition can not now be foreseen nor predicted. But having confessed the difficulty of reaching the goal, we then went on to identify the practical and achievable tasks which can and should begin today. Each step leads to reduced readiness to fight, fewer weapons with which to fight, better control of those weapons and above all, confidence in the process which will enable all nations to join in that final agreement to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

Let me briefly describe the steps in terms of their military significance and value. First and absolutely essential: ratify the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. That—that’s got to be done. Nuclear testing was the engine in the nuclear arms race for nearly 50 years and it remains the eye of the needle through which significant prolifern—proliferation efforts must proceed. Witness India and Pakistan. It is tragic and unconscionable that one U.S. senator can block U.S. ratification, but Jesse Helms is doing exactly that today.

Meanwhile the departments of energy and defense should agree to end those sub-critical nuclear tests, cancel construction of the Nuclear Ign—National Ignition Facility and cancel plans to resume the production of Tritium. Until the United States demonstrates that it does not intend to expand and enhance its nuclear war fighting capabilities through these programs, then we will be sending the signal that we can do it and you can’t and you’d better get your own weapons.

The United States should also lead strongly and present proposals to achieve a cut-off in the production of weapons grade fissile material. A tragic fact is that there is an awesome glut of pluta--plutonium and highly enriched uranium in the world today. The best current estimates are that there are 225 metric tons of plutonium and 1,750 metric tons of highly enriched uranium of weapons grade. Finding secure environmentally safe storage for huge quantities of these dangerous materials until an acceptable means of final disposition can be reached, is not a trivial problem in achieving nuclear abolition. It is illogical and wasteful therefore, to go on producing more fissile material to compound the problem. Here at least the United States is already setting a good example, but we must be prepared to induce others, particularly Russia ah, to join in this cut-off and the treaty should be developed and ratified.

The next step is for the United States to declare formally that it will never again be the first to use nuclear weapons. The deliberately threatening tenor of presidential decision directive 60 is destabilizing in that it suggests that we might make early use of our nukes, even against a non-nuclear state. We’re threatening to use nuclear weapons. This is yet another example of how U.S. policy imperils non-proliferation.

Now, after these positive steps away from preparing for nuclear war, the United States should expand on efforts to reach a Start 3 agreement with a ceiling of no more than 1,000 strategic warheads on each side. That should be our initial target. In truth, the Russians can never afford to implement Start 2 at the 3,000 to 35 hundred weapon level, and they strongly favor much lower numbers. Last time we had to negotiate ‘em up to 35 hundred. That makes absolutely no sense that we should be negotiating down.

Simultaneously with Start 3 negotiations, practical arrangements to take all U.S. and Russian nuclear forces off of strategic alert should be developed and agreed. It makes absolutely no sense to keep nuclear weapons ready to launch on five minutes notice when there’s no conceivable reason to fire them in the first place.

Three years ago we saw the Russians nearly panic when they failed to take notice of our announcement of the scheduled launch of a research rocket from a site in Norway. For a brief period the matter actually reached President Yeltsin in his nuclear football, and defense officials there considered the need to respond to a missile attack from the United States. Fortunately this time they stopped short of retaliating with ICBMs. Both sides, for that reason, should be ready and anxious to eliminate the possibility of similar human system error protecting—provoking an actual nuclear strike in the future. To further reduce the level of danger by providing even more time to evaluate potential threats, the physical separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles should begin under the supervision of UN teams composed of members from the non-nuclear states. We need people looking over our shoulders.

The de-mated warheads should be moved to storage and facilities suitably distant from launch sites. Security and accountability at the remote sites would be maintained by UN teams. Once the Star 3 levels of weapons have been agreed, the actual physical disassembly of the excess warheads and bombs would be accomplished under close supervision by IAEA, until only the number of permitted weapons remained in existence.

All fissile material removed would be accounted for and stored under the IAEA supervision. To the extent that disassembly of weapons is already proceeding in Russia and the U.S., it is proving to be an expensive burden to Russia, as ah, Bill Arkin mentioned. Here , for once, the U.S. is playing a constructive role through the [cooperating?] threat and reduction program which is otherwise known as [Non Lugar?] and we are providing financial assistance to aid in accounting for, storing, maintaining security over Russian fish—fissile material. Ah, they’ve just ah, added 442 mill—million dollars—442 million dollars to the 99 budget and this is the best money for security the Pentagon spends—far better than 2 billion dollars each for B-2 bombers and submarines.

Having completed this much of the build-down pro—process, the two nuclear giants would have reduced their nuclear war fighting forces by approximately 85% and equally importantly, effectively re--rendered the remaining 15% inoperable for periods measured in months rather than years. International supervision would give full and timely warning of any attempt to restore the operational capability of the remaining strategic forces.

Now, at this point you bring in China, France, and the UK and you start negotiating all of the numbers down to even lower levels. I think it’s encouraging to note the UK’s already doing some of this, and China has committed itself to reduce and ultimat—ultimately reduce all of its weapons when the United States and Russia are wise enough to move in that direction.

The de facto nuclear states, India and Pakistan, would also be included in the final elimination, ah, arrangements. I see a special problem with respect to Israel, but I think that international guarantees of the security and safety of the state of Israel would enable them to join in the abolition movement because I don’t think they could stand again—against the whole world when nuclear abolition was a reality.

At this point, I believe the nuclear abolition effort would have achieved a critical mass of political and military substance that would generate universal support to find solutions to the sensitive endgame problems of getting down to zero. This is what the admirals and generals could not foresee and I can’t see, but there is going to be a way, when you have—are approaching it. Abolition would no longer be an unrealistic goal, but a clearly achievable means of ending the dangers of nuclear war and it would above all, create a genuine, global, non-proliferation regime under which non-nuclear states would willingly forego efforts to develop their own nuclear capabilities and they would be secure in the knowledge that the nuclear states were finally living up to their obligations under Article 6 of the non-proliferation treaty.

Even in this halcyon world, there would always remain the possibility that another Saddam Hussein could arise and attempt to pursue a covert nuclear program. As we know from the relatively recent North Korean and Iraqi examples, however, it is impossible to conceal all evidence of such a program very long. In today’s world where some nations may legally possess thousands of weapons, it is very difficult to build a consensus for action against a nuclear wannabe. That’s why we’re not getting cooperation in putting pressure on Iraq. We’re not doing anything to lead. However, in a world entirely without nuclear weapons, there would be immediate recognition of the need for prompt, positive measures to halt any threat to peace. Once a violation of the MPT was detected, a strong consensus among nations without nuclear weapons, would support this timely, concerted, political, economic, and if necessary military action against the offender—to end violations long before the violator could achieve any significant military capability to create or employ nuclear weapons.

Here, I must emphasize that the steps I’ve just outlined are not necessarily the only route to nuclear abolition, nor would they alone guarantee success. But I do have a strong conviction that they describe one practical and progressive approach to abolition which is achievable with imagination, persistence and strong American leadership. Necessary arrangements will not be easily or quickly achieved, but once the will exists progress will develop a momentum that could lead to surprising success much earlier than we can now conceive.

IN preparation for this presentation I talked to Helen and she urged me to tell you why I believe so strongly and passionately that we must all work together for nuclear abolition, so let me conclude with a personal statement.

During the horrible confrontation with the Soviet Union we call the Cold War, I frequently stood nuclear alert watch on aircraft carriers. For a period of time, my assigned target was an industrial complex in Eastern Europe, ah, the hub of the transportation network and some warehouses. Although destruction of that target would have done little to defeat the Soviet Union, it was only one of dozens of comparable targets to be attacked by aircraft from the two carriers of the sixth fleet. My bomb alone—just my bomb would have resulted in the death of an estimated 600,000 human beings. Multiply that 40 or 50 times and you can understand what the two carriers alone would have done and that was only a fraction of the planned destruction to be wreaked by hundreds of aircraft and missiles coming from NATO bases in Europe.

Later I served as director of military operations for all U.S. forces in Europe where I was responsible for the security, readiness and control of 7,000 nuclear weapons available for use by NATO forces. Despite the obvious fact that those weapons would never defend Europe, only destroy everything, the U.S. was then urging NATO to add neutron bombs, Pershing 2 missiles and ground launch cruise missiles to the European arsenal. Never enough for the military.

It is from these up close and personal experiences that I came to understand that nuclear weapons are truly unusable, worthless for any rational, military purpose. If war is ever warranted, it is to achieve some identifiable objective and to prevent or end evils greater than war itself. But when fought with nuclear weapons, the war destroys whatever the objective might have been, and there ah, is no evil greater than the barbaric, indiscriminate destruction which the weapons would inflict on the earth and all those who inhabit it.

I was asked also to explain [applause] if all of us doing all of this training and these preparations realized the consequences that our actions would have, whether if the order [to?] came, would we really—ah, the order to use the bombs ever came, would we actually carry out the missions. I told Helen then and I tell you here, the answer is yes. Although I’m not a psychologist, I do understand the principal of denial and the repetitive, sterile, sort of harmless nature of training exercises inured you to the consequences of nuclear warfare. Ah, in enabled you to deny that carrying out your duties in war would have any, ah, inhumane or criminal consequences. After all, just pushing a button or dropping a bomb, just as you’d done hundreds of times in training situations would not kill hundreds of thousands of human beings, it would just produced "collateral damage."

Denial also enabled one to accept the proposition that we were not preparing actually to use those weapons. By the very fact that we were prepared to use them, we were deterring nuclear war and deterrence was good—it would save lives. The strategic air command proclaimed, "peace is our profession," as they prepared to explode thousands of warheads and—and bombs. Yes, the danger is real that the buttons will be pushed and the bombs will be dropped just as long as nuclear weapons exist. It is this convection—conviction that sent me to Rome in 1982 with Helen and brings me here today. If the weapons exist, ultimately then will be used.

While we have the gift of time to find a way to rid ourselves of these monstrous engines of total devastation we must work together strongly and persistently to do so. We humans have turned the 20^th century into the most violent world—period in the history of the world. For our children and their children, we must bring an end to the danger of—that nuclear weapons will make the 21^st century even more destructive.

Let me close with the words of the 62 generals and admirals: Quote, "We have been presented with a challenge of the highest possible historic importance--the creation of a nuclear weapons free world. The end of the Cold War makes it possible, the dangers of proliferation terrorism and a nuclear arms race render it necessary. We must not fail to seize our opportunity. There is no alternative." So long.